Designer's Diary Part 6 - That Others May Live: The Cards

With the recent release of my game, That Others May Live: Combat Search and Rescue - Vietnam, I thought I'd explain the history and some facts behind some of the cards. One of the challenges of designing TOML was trying to simulate the effects of different kinds of ordnance and aircraft maneuvers with counters and cards. 

Since I wanted to avoid the use of hexes and math-heavy charts, I needed a way to illustrate how certain ordnance worked. The cards and markers in the game give a rough approximation of their effects on the battlefield. In this post, I'll provide a little more background that might help to shed light on the game's mechanics and how and why the ordnance was historically employed.

Much of the information here was taken from Ralph Rowley's report called Tactics & Techniques of Close Air Support Operations 1961 - 1973. Various first-hand accounts of combat aviators helped to further inform my approach to the design and effects of the cards and I'll go further into those sources in a later post.

1. Attack

The “Attack” card represents standard use of free-fall 250-to-500-pound iron bombs to destroy targets. These bombs were part of the standard load on both combat jets and the propeller-driven A-1 Skyraider.

One of the problems of using iron bombs during the Vietnam War was their inability to penetrate the thick jungle canopy and destroy their intended target. In addition, the bombs were unguided and imprecise, especially when being used to attack targets concealed by terrain. Iron bombs were usually ruled out when opposing forces were in close contact with one another. 

2. Ordnance: CS Gas

Codenamed “Juicy Fruit”, CS (2-chlorobenzylidene malononitrile) or Tear Gas was sometimes employed by CSAR rescue crews to incapacitate the enemy just before helicopters were sent in to rescue a downed pilot. On the rare occasions when the authorization was given to use it, the A-1 Skyraiders carried CBU-19 and CBU-30 dispensers, filled with 1,280 BLU-29 submunitions full of CS gas.

A-1 Skyraider with CBU-30 on inboard pylon.

The use of CS had several major drawbacks. Most notably, it interfered with rescue crews’ ability to operate effectively. Both A-1 and Jolly Green pilots would need to wear gas masks while flying in areas contaminated with CS gas. This not only reduced visibility, but also made voice and radio communication nearly impossible.

One survivor of a 1969 SAR effort described its effects as follows:

I might as well tell you what it feels like when that stuff goes off. I ran into a tree and was wrapped around the tree urinating, defecating, and retching all at the same instant ....It also made me want to sneeze.... It goes into effect instantaneously. Physically and mentally you can't control yourself.... After that every time I'd come up on the air and ask for Vodka [the “word of the day"], as soon as I'd tell them where, how far and the heading, I'd tell them “Don't get it close to me.”

The use of CS gas was also seen as controversial by some military and civilian war planners. There was intense debate both behind doors and in the American media as to the ethics of using chemical warfare, especially in proximity to civilians. 

3. Mark Target

Even at slower speeds, it was nearly impossible for rescue aircraft to spot the enemy on the ground. White phosphorous bombs, and later on, rockets were used by Forward Air Controllers to mark the location of concealed targets in order to properly guide pilots to the correct objectives. 

The standard O-2 aircraft was unarmed except for two rocket pods that could fire up to seven 2.75 inch rockets (FLAR) each. In addition to the WP rockets, the FAC could also “talk” the pilot on to their target by radio, which was less accurate and consumed more time than using the WP markers.

White phosphorous had several problems as target markers. The first one being that the wind quickly blew the smoke off-target. Secondly, the rockets would sink into soft terrain and be extinguished. To rectify this problem, rockets were often fired at a shallow dive that involved a turning approach.

With the target at 3 or 9 o'clock, the controller retarded throttles, lifted the nose a little to drain off airspeed to 100 knots, and rolled into his final approach. As the aircraft came around, the FAC dipped the nose so he could bring the gunsight pipper up to center on the target at release point. The power-on approach was adopted when ground fire intensified. - Rowley, page 75

4. MIGCAP

Enemy aircraft represented a grave threat to Combat Search and Rescue operations throughout Southeast Asia. North Vietnamese fighter pilots were often vectored toward CSAR operations to disrupt American efforts. Although it was standard to assign fighters to combat air patrol to protect the rescue team, there was always the possibility that things would go wrong.

Such was the case on 28 January 1970 when a MiG-21 slipped past the MIGCAP fighters protecting a SAR operation near the border of North Vietnam and Laos. The MiG scored a missile hit on a Jolly Green rescue helicopter (Jolly Green 71) and destroyed it, killing all aboard. A short video about the incident can be seen here.

5. Move Survivor

If a rescue operations area was too hot with enemy guns, the CSAR commander might ask the downed pilot to move away from ground-based threats. In two notable rescues - the cases of Lt. Colonel Iceal Hambleton and Kenny Wayne Fields, the presence of nearby enemy anti-aircraft guns forced the downed airmen to relocate to safer positions in order to effect a rescue attempt. 

Needless to say, this was extremely risky. The survivor would need to evade search teams and/or a hostile civilian population. Many American pilots learned from their brief Escape and Evasion course in The Philippines that the best tactic was to find concealment in the jungle and wait until the last possible minute to move to a pickup location just before help arrived. 

The harsh terrain of North Vietnam and Laos made movement difficult and dangerous. For those survivors who were wounded, as often occurred due to ejection or a hard landing, it was nearly impossible.

6. Ordnance: Napalm

Manufactured by DOW Chemical Corporation, napalm was employed as both an area-denial weapon and as a form of direct attack against a variety of targets in South East Asia. 

Early in the war, napalm took the form of a flammable mixture of gasoline and soap. The performance of early nape degraded quickly with storage time and eventually was replaced by Napalm B, a mixture of JP-4 fuel, polystyrene, and benzene, which had a longer shelf life and spread over a wider area when dropped.

Throughout the war, an assortment of tactics surrounding the delivery of napalm in a jungle environment were tested. It was ineffective when dropped in dense vegetation areas because it would often ignite the tree canopy without damaging targets on the ground below. Low-speed and low-level tactics were developed for overcoming this problem, but such an approach exposed aircraft to hostile ground fire.

As the war continued, the standard delivery method was to use iron bombs to first "open" the jungle canopy and then drop napalm before strafing the exposed enemy below. Skyraiders carrying napalm would arrive on deck about 1/2 a mile from the target, drop the napalm, and continue straight ahead for another 1/2 mile before pulling up in a climbing turn.

The effects of napalm on human beings are horrific, permanent, and deeply disturbing. The use of napalm was - and still is - highly controversial.

7. Ordnance: CBU

Cluster Bomb Units (CBUs) are area dispersal weapons that consist of hundreds of anti-personnel “bomblets (BLUs).” 

During the Vietnam War approximately 260 million cluster bomblets were dropped, of which approximately 80 million failed to explode. Early in the war, cluster bombs consisted of a bomblets which held a mixture of magnesium, gasoline, and a thickener.

Despite their high failure rate, CBUs were particularly effective in killing infantry and anti-aircraft gun crews. These were also used as area-denial weapons that could be dropped near a survivor to act as an “instant minefield” that could keep enemy search teams at bay until rescue arrived.

Like most other air-dropped ordnance, CBUs were prone to failures due to the thick jungle terrain. Bomblets would often explode harmlessly among the treetops instead of penetrating the jungle canopy. In addition, these weapons were new at the time and initial failure rates related to aircraft speed and dispersion rates were high, especially when dropped by fast jets.

From 1964, Skyraiders dropped the CBU-14 cluster bomb unit, which held 114 fragmentation bomblets (BLU-3s). The CBU-24 was later developed and employed against anti-aircraft guns and, eventually, a wide variety of other targets.

Operational tests in April 1966 proved beyond a shadow of a doubt the flak suppression possibilities of the new weapon. Soviet antiaircraft units used by the North Vietnamese were only about ten to 12 feet across, an extremely difficult target to knock out even though only a small amount of damage could render them inoperative. CBUs, by literally pockmarking an entire area, could either knock out the antiaircraft weapon or prevent it from firing, thus providing the maximum amount of cover for U.S. aircraft, surpassing even napalm in effectiveness. It did not take a great deal of imagination to envision other tactical uses for CBUs unrelated to flak suppression. - Krepon, Michael, Foreign Affairs, Vol. 52. No. 3, (1974), page 598. 

8. Request Aircraft

CSAR missions were high priority and it was seldom a problem to find pilots willing to lend a hand in rescuing a fellow airman who had been shot down. However, it was not always a given that nearby aircraft would have enough fuel or ordnance (or the right kind of ordnance) to prove useful to a Combat Search and Rescue effort.

In addition, the coordination of fast-moving aircraft between the FAC and the on-scene commander was a challenge at the best of times. The O-2 Skymaster had no less than three radios, all of which required constant monitoring in order to effectively work against enemy forces while at the same time avoiding a mid-air collision. 

This card represents the ability to request and effectively employ aircraft in a timely manner – not a small challenge in a dynamic and high threat environment.

9. Request Exfil Team

At times when it was impossible or extremely hazardous to achieve an airborne rescue of a downed pilot, there was the option of using special teams of elite infantry units (Marines, Special Forces, SEALs, etc.) to land in the vicinity of the rescue operation and escort the survivor to safety.

There were times when impassible terrain and heavy enemy troop concentrations ruled even this option out. The time required to coordinate a land-based rescue, infiltrate through enemy lines, and contact a downed pilot could seldom be afforded. Lt. Col. Iceal Hambleton was rescued by a SEAL team after 11 and ½ days trapped behind enemy lines and all other rescue efforts had failed. 

Though Hambleton's ordeal has been recounted across various media, the story of the exfiltration as told by the SEAL team leader, Tom Norris, is equally riveting. Norris, a Medal of Honor recipient, gives a short account of Hambleton's rescue here.

10. Ordnance: Smoke

White Phosphorous munitions were used liberally in Combat Search and Rescue operations in Vietnam. Not only could they be used to mark a target, but it was also a means of identifying a pilot’s exact whereabouts. Asking a survivor to “pop smoke” was standard procedure for most SAR operations. It also served as an obscurant used to degrade the accuracy of NVA gunners against slow and low-flying aircraft, especially helicopters.

Despite its promise, smoke was not always useful or practical in all situations. High winds would cause smoke clouds to rapidly dissipate, often at the most inopportune times. Shifts in the wind direction could also blind helicopter pilots and create unanticipated hazards on the way to or from a rescue pickup. 

A wall of smoke could be generated by Skyraiders with the employment of the CBU-22 dispenser, which dropped BLU-17 smoke bomblets.

11. Smoke Marker

It was common practice for a survivor’s location to be marked by a Smoke marker or smoke bomb just prior to rescue. Colored smoke bombs provided an essential form of marking a rescue location as the helicopters made their final approach to a pickup.

The NVA were quick to catch on to this tactic, and they would often use the smoke marker’s location to find and capture a downed pilot. CSAR crews adapted by dropping smoke markers in areas away from the survivor’s location in order to confuse the enemy search parties and draw them away from the real pickup location.

Smoke markers could also be used to conceal a survivor’s movements away from enemy positions.

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Smoke bombs were carried by Skyraiders in the form of the 100-pound AN-M47A4 white phosphorous munition.

12. Suppress

Due to the difficulty of locating and destroying concealed enemy guns from the air, suppression tactics were often aimed at “keeping the enemy gunner’s heads down” rather than necessarily destroying an enemy gun. Strafing and rocket fire were one form of suppression. Another method was to conduct “dry runs” in the target area in which aircraft would swoop toward their targets without using any ordnance.

Since it was standard practice for NVA gunners to fire at aircraft and then jump into trenches as they came in on the final leg of their attack run, it was possible for a pilot to suppress a gun without necessarily having to drop ordnance. However, it wouldn’t take long for the crew to mount their anti-aircraft weapons and resume fire.

Suppression efforts during a rescue operation occurred prior to, during, and after a pickup. When going in for a final approach, the lead Sandys would fly a series of slow S-turns in front of the helicopters, sweeping back and forth to draw enemy fire. 

The other Sandys would follow on the flanks and in the rear, making similar S-turns and flying above the formation. When gunfire erupted from below, the Sandys would rush in and suppress with iron bombs, strafing, and napalm. 

Helicopter crews would mark gun site positions with smoke grenades. These would be suppressed by Skyraiders or fast-moving jets.

13. Troll for Fire

Before sending vulnerable helicopters in for a pickup, it was necessary to find out what dangers lurked in wait for them. One of the key roles of slow moving CSAR aircraft was to fly low over the jungle canopy in a deliberate effort to tempt the enemy gunners below into opening fire. This deadly tactic gave away the position of the enemy but exposed trolling aircraft to an unknown danger. It also took time - a luxury that no combat search and rescue operation could afford.

FACs were adept at locating enemy positions in areas they knew and were familiar with. Flying low and slow, the pilots were able to observe patterns that could indicate the possible presence of the enemy. For example, the amount of laundry hung out for drying could indicate the NVA or VC passing through a village. The presence of cooking fires in unusual places might reveal where the enemy was located and give an overall idea of their numbers. This was information that simply could not be gleaned from fast moving combat jets or pilots who were not well acquainted with an area of operations. 

14. Event Card: VNAF Skyraiders

Trained and equipped by the American military, the Vietnamese National Air Force pilots flew approximately 350 Skyraiders during the conflict. Only 40 of these aircraft remained by the end of the war. 

Despite exhaustive training, many VNAF pilots were reluctant to engage the enemy without an overwhelming advantage in numbers and only in situations where their aircraft faced minimal exposure to hostile fire. A major reason for this approach was because of their government’s policy of holding individual pilots personally responsible for fratricide and the damage or loss of their own aircraft. VNAF pilots who lost an aircraft in combat faced the possibility of heavy fines, extra duties, and lengthy prison sentences.

On the other hand, when the VNAF did show up for battle, their appearance was rarely forgettable. As FAC Marshall Harrison describes in his book, “A Lonely Kind of War”:

 “They flew over the target, rolled the nose nearly vertical into a dive, and came straight down…They usually dumped everything on one pass and the effect, if they were on the correct target, could be devastating.”

15. Rules of Engagement

One common theme throughout CSAR narratives is the frustration of dealing with what appeared to be an arbitrary and ever-changing set of rules for engaging the enemy. For political reasons, certain targets or locations would be restricted from attack. Certain ordnance was forbidden from being employed or carried for reasons that were not really clear to those participating in these operations. 

Almost every day, this list of restrictions seemed to grow. Sometimes the rules could be ambiguous or even contradictory at the best of times, which frustrated rescue efforts and stifled decision-making at crucial times. Usually, the individuals who drew up the ROE were civilians in Washington or non-combat military personnel far away from the action. 

The resentment that this created among aviators throughout the war still persists to this day, and it is unclear how many rescue operations were ultimately thwarted and hamstrung by rules that made no sense but nevertheless strictly enforced.

For an excellent overview of the arguments between American military and civilian leadership over rules of engagement during Operation Rolling Thunder, check out Wayne Thompson's book, "To Hanoi and Back: The USAF and North Vietnam, 1966-1973. The book is freely available as part of the Air Force History and Museums Program and can be downloaded here.